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ADAM, EVE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SOME
THOUGHTS ON THE OBSCENE AS SACRED*
SHELDON H. NAHMOD**
And the Lord God commanded the man, saying: 'Of every tree of the
garden thou mayest eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil,
thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou
shalt surely die.'... And they were both naked, the man and his wife,
and were not ashamed.... And the serpent said unto the woman: 'Ye
shall not surely die; for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof,
then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good
and evil.'... [S]he took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she gave
also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. And the eyes of them
both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they
sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves girdles .... Therefore
the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden .... I
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?... Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred.2
INTRODUCTION
First Amendment obscenity doctrine and its accompanying rhetoric
are grounded on the assumption that obscene material is without literary,
artistic, political, scientific or other value. Indeed, obscenity itself is de-
fined as having low value or no value. Lack of value is typically put in
harm-causing terms: obscenity causes violent antisocial conduct, cor-
rupts character and erodes moral standards through persuasion and indi-
rect degradation of values. 3 This lack of value is the reason that material
identified as obscene can be excluded from protection under the First
Amendment: obscene material adds little or nothing to the marketplace
Copyright © 1992 by Sheldon H. Nahmod.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology; A.B. 1962, University of Chicago; J.D. 1965, LL.M. 1971, Harvard University; Graduate
Student at Large, 1993-, University of Chicago Divinity School.
1. Genesis 1: 26-28; Genesis 2: 16-17, 25; Genesis 3: 4-7, 23, in PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS
(J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1978).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (emphasis added).
3. See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1207-08 (2d ed. 1991) (cataloging
"the interests furthered by the suppression of obscenity"). Also noted are the interests in protecting
adults from the "shock effect" of unexpected exposure to obscenity and in protecting minors from
harm.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of ideas and does not promote self-government. 4
I propose to deconstruct 5 this low value assumption of First
Amendment obscenity doctrine by turning it on its head. In my view,
the obscenity exception to the First Amendment may also be explained in
large measure as carving out an area in which the state is permitted to
maintain the sacred aspect of sexuality so as to prevent private market
forces from debasing, commercializing and effectively desacralizing it.
Thus, certain kinds of obscenity are excluded from First Amendment
coverage not because they have little or no value but rather because they
have such high value that they are sacred. 6
This move shifts the explanation of obscenity regulation away from
a negative Augustinian, original sin view of sexuality and toward a very
different affirmative Judaeo/Christian view of it. As will be seen, com-
peting interpretations of the Biblical narrative of Adam, Eve and the
serpent 7 ground these different views of sexuality. The move also has
4. The third mainstream rationale of the First Amendment is individual autonomy/self-
fulfillment.
5. Jacques Derrida is the thinker most associated with deconstruction. See STRUCTURALISM
AND SINCE: FROM LEVI-STRAUSS TO DERRIDA 169-70 (John Sturrock ed., 1979). While he is also
an influential philosopher, it is Derrida as an interpreter of texts who is of relevance here. Derrida
explicated deconstruction, an interpretive technique that focuses on inverting textual hierarchies and
meanings. Derrida's deconstructive approach is based both on the instability and indeterminacy of
language emphasized by Friedrich Nietzsche and on what Ferdinand de Saussure called the arbi-
trary relationship between the signifier and the signified. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and
Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense 171 & 178, in EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(Maximilian A. Mugge trans., 1964); Jonathan Culler, Introduction to FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS, at xiv-xv n.l (1959).
However, Derrida goes further by indicating that texts themselves have lives separate and apart
from their authors and contain incompatible meanings. That is, there is no authoritative meaning;
there are only meanings. In a famous passage, Derrida puts it this way:
[R]eading... cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward
a referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a
signified outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of
language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in
general .... There is nothing outside of the text.
JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1977).
Derrida obviously did not invent the idea of interpretive ambiguity. Nevertheless, deconstruc-
tion is useful in connection with my move to invert the low value assumption of First Amendment
obscenity doctrine by replacing it with a view of certain kinds of obscenity as possessing extremely
high value.
6. The claim that there is a close connection between the obscene and the sacred has to be
qualified because the fit between the obscene and the sacred is not perfect. Not every sexual act that
is obscene is sacred. For example, depictions of sexual relations between people and animals, and.
depictions of excretory functions, are not sacred even though they can be obscene under the Miller v.
California test. However, this is not inconsistent with my interpretation because such depictions still
debase sexuality even though they are not themselves sacred. Thus, prohibitions against such depic-
tions function prophylactically to protect the sacred nature of sexuality. Obscene child pornography
can be similarly explained under my approach. Cf New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
The applicability of my interpretation to depictions of homosexual conduct is considered in Part
IV, which also comments on pornography and feminist theory.
7. See Genesis, supra note 1.
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intriguing implications for the relation between First Amendment ob-
scenity doctrine and the substantive due process right of privacy. In-
deed, under this approach, obscenity and privacy may be considered two
sides of the same coin. Furthermore, the move may suggest possible
changes in obscenity and privacy doctrine as well, although that is not
the purpose of this Article.
I. THE LOW VALUE ASSUMPTION OF OBSCENITY DOCTRINE
First Amendment doctrine is hierarchical. Certain kinds of
speech-political speech is a good example-have a more privileged sta-
tus than other kinds of speech which are accorded either lesser First
Amendment protection or no First Amendment protection at all. This
hierarchical flavor is captured in the famous Chaplinsky dictum:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.8
The assumption that the obscene is not protected by the First
Amendment because of obscenity's lack of value played its first Supreme
Court role in Roth v. United States9, a seminal Supreme Court obscenity
decision. In his since-regretted opinion, Justice Brennan stated for the
Court:
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the
area of protected speech and press.... [All] ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controver-
sial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have
the full protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But im-
plicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscen-
ity as utterly without redeeming social importance . . . . [In] light of
this history, it is apparent [that] obscenity... [was] outside the protec-
tion intended for speech and press. [We therefore] hold that obscenity
is not with the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.' 0
The Court in Roth thus defined obscenity in no-value terms as "ut-
terly without redeeming social importance." Distinguishing sex from ob-
8. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
9. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10. Id. at 481, 483-85.
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scenity, the Court went on to declare: "Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest .... [The
proper test is] whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest."'1
The Roth Court's assertion that obscenity is outside the protection
of the First Amendment has been much criticized on both historical and
explanatory grounds. More important for present purposes, though, is
the continued viability in Supreme Court case law of the assumption that
obscenity has little or no value. Just as this assumption was part of the
Roth definition of obscenity, it is part of the currently applicable defini-
tion of obscenity articulated in Miller v. California.'2 While the Miller
Court retained Roth's criterion of prurient interest and added the crite-
rion of patent offensiveness, it rejected Roth's "utterly without redeeming
social value" standard and insisted that the work must lack "serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 3 Hence, under Miller, mate-
rial which has some value may still be judged obscene so long as it does
not have serious value.
This assumption-that obscene material by definition has little or no
value-is what I wish to deconstruct.
II. DECONSTRUCTING OBSCENITY DOCTRINE AND THE SACRED
A. Deconstructing Obscenity
I observed earlier that First Amendment doctrine is hierarchical be-
cause it is grounded on assessments of the value of different kinds of
speech. Certain speech is accorded maximum First Amendment protec-
tion while other speech, such as defamation and commercial speech, is
accorded somewhat less protection. However, obscenity is accorded no
First Amendment protection at all because it is considered to have little
or no value. Once material is defined as obscene, it is entirely outside of
the world of the First Amendment even though it is clearly speech. In-
deed, it is more accurate to describe obscenity as beneath the world of the
First Amendment, consigned to a special Hell.
When obscenity is placed beneath the world of the First Amend-
ment (the center), it has thereby become marginalized. Obscenity has
been given an existence apart from the First Amendment so that First
11. Id. at 487, 489.
12. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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Amendment concerns and rhetoric are automatically excluded once ma-
terial is found to be obscene.
Deconstructing obscenity doctrine changes all of this. Such a move
inverts the hierarchy of values under current First Amendment law. In-
stead of possessing little or no value, obscenity is now sacralized and
given the highest value. Rather than being placed beneath the world of
the First Amendment, obscenity is located above the world of the First
Amendment, at the top of any hierarchy.
A deconstructive move is often interesting for its own sake because
it functions as a kind of aesthetic or literary technique to force an inter-
preter to see texts in an entirely new light. But there is considerably
more than this implicated in the obscenity setting. A deconstruction of
obscenity doctrine through inverting the dominant low value assumption
sheds some light on the possible religious sources of obscenity doctrine
and its relation to sexuality. It also suggests a close connection to sub-
stantive due process privacy doctrine.
I want to make clear at the outset that I am making no historical
claims for this interpretation of obscenity. I do not know whether or to
what extent obscenity doctrine is in fact grounded on the sacred as a
matter of the "original intent" of the framers or the thinking of the
Supreme Court. It is enough, for me at least, that the endeavor explains
current obscenity doctrine at least as well as, if not better than, the low
value assumption and that it generates some interesting insights.
B. The Concept of the Sacred 14
The distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred appeared sev-
eral millennia ago in Western religion. Although it did not originate
with Judaism, the Pentateuch repeatedly emphasizes the distinction be-
tween "Koh'desh" (the sacred or holy) and "Chol" (the non-sacred or
non-holy) in connection, for example, with the Israelites (the "holy peo-
ple") and the land of Israel (the "holy land"). 15 The concept of the sa-
cred was carried over into Christianity, but it was not until the 20th
century that it became important in the comparative study of religions.1 6
Theologian Mircea Eliade, in an influential book, The Sacred and
14. This discussion of the concept of the sacred is adapted from, and based on, the more
comprehensive discussion in Sheldon Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First Amendment, 66 IND.
L. J. 511, 527-30 (1991).
15. Eg., Leviticus 19:1-2 in PENTATEUCH AND HAFrRAHs, supra note I ("And the Lord
spoke unto Moses, saying. Speak unto all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto
them, Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy.").
16. See RUDOLPH OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE SACRED (Eng. trans. 1928).
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the Profane,17 focuses on the concept of the sacred with its aspects of awe
and separateness, and articulates a comprehensive theory regarding reli-
gion. In particular, he demonstrates the ways in which humanity divides
time, space and matter into the two realms of the sacred and the non-
sacred, or the holy and the non-holy.
Eliade begins his analysis with a discussion of those ways in which
the sacred manifests itself in human life through what he calls hier-
ophany, i.e., the sacred literally making itself seen.18 According to
Eliade, the history of religion is, in essence, a great number of these hier-
ophanies, each of which represents the same phenomenon: a manifesta-
tion of a wholly different reality. Further, the worship of seemingly
ordinary places and things, such as rocks or sacred groves, is in fact a
recognition of the hierophany rather than a veneration of the object it-
self. This is true because the object, while remaining itself, has, through
the hierophany, become transformed into another supernatural reality.
As in the Christian mystery of transubstantiation, the object retains all
the substance and accidents of its original nature while also assuming the
substance of the sacred object.19
After an extensive analysis of sacred space and sacred time, Eliade
considers the sacralization of nature and natural objects. He discusses
the symbolism of water which represents creation or the possibility of re-
creation. He then moves on to other symbols. He examines in particular
the symbols adopted by Christianity. He also considers the sacralization
of life as a whole whereby the human body is made sacred through ritual
and becomes a realization of the cosmos. 20 At the same time, he de-
scribes the many symbols present in this sacralization, from domestic
objects to funerary objects, each of which is made holy in itself. Eliade
goes on to assess rites of passage, initiation, and rebirth, and how these
convert the human body and related objects into religious symbols.
Eliade concludes The Sacred and the Profane with an examination
of the presence of the sacred in modem life. He maintains that even
modem, non-religious man is still surrounded by the sacred and by rit-
ual, as reflected in political parties, the occult and philosophical move-
ments such as those for nudism or sexual freedom.
In short, the majority of men "without religion" still hold to pseudo
religions and degenerated mythologies. There is nothing surprising in
this, for ... profane man is the descendant of homo religiosus and he
17. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE (1957).
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. at 175-79.
[Vol. 68:377
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE OBSCENE AS SACRED
cannot wipe out his own history.2 1
Eliade's insights into the sacred, together with his discussion of the
sacralization of different human activities and the continued presence of
the sacred in modem life, are helpful in grounding my deconstruction of
First Amendment obscenity doctrine. Eliade's work suggests the inter-
pretive possibility that the representation of certain kinds of sexual con-
duct may be considered sacred under First Amendment obscenity
doctrine, and therefore prohibited by the state, because the conduct is
itself sacred.
As I will show, sacralizing obscenity by means of my interpretive
move is not so far-fetched as it might initally appear. Indeed, it derives
some support from the history of the concept of original sin.
III. JUDAEO/CHRISTIAN VIEWS OF SEXUAL CONDUCT
AND ITS REPRESENTATION
The low value assumption of current First Amendment obscenity
doctrine can be viewed as premised on the Augustinian position on origi-
nal sin that considers sexual conduct, even between husband and wife, to
be inherently sinful. In contrast, an interpretation of certain kinds of
obscenity as sacred can be grounded on the very different Judaeo/Chris-
tian position that sexual conduct is not only not sinful but is inherently
good and indeed sacred.
A. The Judaic Position
The Judaic account of sexual conduct stems from its interpretation
of the story of creation and of Adam, Eve and the serpent. Under this
account as it appears in Genesis,22 men and women are told by God to be
fruitful and multiply. The reason that Adam and Eve are expelled from
the Garden of Eden has little to do with their sexuality, but is rather the
result of their disobedience to God. Rabbinic interpretation further
maintains that even though the primary function of marriage is the legiti-
mation of sexual relations between man and woman for the purpose of
procreation, sexual relations may, and should, nevertheless take place be-
tween husband and wife where procreation is not possible. Indeed, the
21. Id. at 209.
22. Genesis 1: 26-28, reads as follows:
And God said: 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.'... And God created
man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He
them. And God blessed them; and God said unto them: 'Be fruitful and multiply, and
replenish the earth, and subdue it.'
See also Genesis, supra note 1.
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husband is under an affirmative obligation to engage in sexual relations
with his wife.
Consequently, traditional Judaism views sexual relations between
husband and wife as salutary for two reasons: procreation and pleasure.
In no sense, particularly in the context of marriage, are sexual relations
sinful. In fact, they are considered sacred. Under Judaic law, celibacy
and abstinence are discouraged and even considered unnatural.
. The Christian Positions
Elaine Pagels observes in her recent book, Adam, Eve and the
Serpent,23 that there was a split in early Christianity with regard to the
connection between sexual relations and sin, a split stemming from con-
fficting interpretations of Genesis and the narrative of Adam, Eve and
the serpent. At one extreme, there were early Christians who took the
position that sexual relations were to be encouraged for procreation pur-
poses in marriage. Like the Rabbis, they did not view sexual relations as
inherently sinful and, like the Rabbis, they considered the sin of Adam
and Eve to be disobedience to God.
For example, Clement of Alexandria, who lived one hundred years
after Paul, interpreted Paul as follows: "In general, all the letters of the
apostle teach self-control and continence, and contain numerous instruc-
tions about marriage, begetting children, and domestic life, but they no-
where exclude self-controlled marriage."'24 Building on this and other
statements of Clement, Pagels asserts that "Clement rejects, above all,
the claim that Adam and Eve's sin was to engage in sexual intercourse-
a view common among such teachers as Tatian the Syrian, who taught
that the fruit of the tree of knowledge conveyed carnal knowledge. ' 25 In
her view, "Clement confirms the traditional Jewish conviction, expressed
in the deutero-Pauline letters, that legitimate procreation is a good work,
blessed by God from the day of human creation. ' 26
At the other extreme, there were early Christians who interpreted
Genesis, together with certain statements attributed to Jesus in the Gos-
pels, for the proposition that the sin of Adam and Eve was embodied in
their discovery of sexuality through their disobedience to God. Tatian
the Syrian, mentioned above, is one example. Pagels states that he
"blamed Adam for inventing marriage, believing that for this sin God
23. ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE AND THE SERPENT (1988).
24. Clement, Stromota 3,84 (John Ernest Leonard Oulton & Henry Chadwik trans.) in 2 ALEX-
ANDRI N CHRISTIANrTY, 40-92, quoted in PAGELS, supra note 23, at 27.
25. PAGELS, Supra note 23, at 27.
26. Id.
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expelled Adam and his partner in crime from Paradise. '27
Jerome is another example. After describing Jesus as "a virgin in
the flesh and monogamist in the spirit," he declared: "I will say what the
apostle [Paul] has taught me... indeed in view of the purity of the body
of Christ, all sexual intercourse is unclean. ' 28 Jerome put his famous
quarrel with Jovinian as follows:
He puts marriage on a level with virginity, while I make it inferior; he
declares that there is little or no difference between the two states; I
claim that there is a great deal. Finally . . . he has dared to place
marriage on an equal level with perpetual chastity. 29
For these and other Christians, then, original sin meant that sexual
relations were inherently sinful and would only, and barely, be tolerated
for procreation purposes in the context of marriage. Under this view,
Christian values were best promoted through monogamy.
Pagels contends that this latter original sin position, directly con-
nected to sexuality, was taken by Augustine in the fourth century. He
read the story of Adam, Eve and the serpent as showing that "the sexual
desire of our disobedient members arose in those first human beings as a
result of the sin of disobedience ... and because a shameless movement
resisted the rule of their will, they covered their shameful members."'30
This original sin was transmitted to the human race as follows:
The entire human race that was to pass through woman into offspring
was contained in the first man when that married couple received the
divine sentence condemning them to punishment, and humanity pro-
duced what humanity became, not what it was when created, but
when, having sinned, it was punished.31
The major point of Pagels's book is her contention that political fac-
tors were largely responsible for the fact that Augustine's position even-
tually became the dominant one in the Catholic Church. After
Christianity became allied with the Roman Empire, freedom was no
longer to be the primary message of the story of Adam, Eve and the
serpent. Rather, Augustine's position on original sin became politically
expedient for the Church "since it persuaded many of his contemporaries
that human beings universally need external government. ' 32
Whatever one thinks of her political assessment, the contrasting
views of sexuality in the early Church, as described by Pagels, can
27. Id.
28. JEROME, ADVERSUS JOVINIANUM 1,10; 20, quoted in PAGELS, supra note 23 at 94.
29. JEROME, LETTER 48, To PAMMACHIUS, 2, quoted in PAGELS, supra note 23, at 95.
30. AUGUSTINE, DE CIVITATE DEI 13,13, quoted in PAGELS, supra note 23, at 111.
31. AUGUSTINE, DE CIVITATE DE! 13,3, quoted in PAGELS, supra note 23, at 109.
32. PAGELS, supra note 23, at xxvi.
1992]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ground the current low value assumption of obscenity doctrine and the
deconstructive interpretation I suggest.
C. The Representation of Sexual Conduct
The dominance of the Augustinian position on original sin and sex-
ual conduct can be connected interpretively to the low value assumption
of First Amendment obscenity doctrine because what is sinful possesses
low value by definition. It also follows from the Augustinian position
that the representation of sexual conduct is similarly sinful because it
could lead to the sinful conduct itself.
Conversely, the contrasting Judaeo/Christian position on the sacred
nature of sexual conduct can be connected interpretively to my decon-
structive move regarding the high value of obscenity. Under this move,
representations of certain sexual conduct are prohibited not because of
the sinfulness of such conduct. Rather, they are prohibited because, as I
suggest shortly, such sexual conduct itself would otherwise be debased
and commercialized and thereby desacralized.
Under this interpretation, a representation of sacred sexual conduct
might even be considered sacred in its own right. One reason is that the
sexual conduct of a man and woman, insofar as it could lead to procrea-
tion, may be viewed as the equivalent of God's act of creating the uni-
verse. Thus, such sexual conduct is God-like and the Second
Commandment prohibits the representation of God.33 Another possible
reason derives from the Genesis account that God created man and wo-
man in His/Her own image. The Second Commandment therefore pro-
hibits representations of sexual conduct because they constitute
representations of God's image. However, this goes beyond representa-
tions of sexual conduct to include every representation of a person, in
much the same way that certain religious or ethnic communities prohibit
picture taking of their members because they believe that their souls
would thereby be taken from them.
The close connection between sexual conduct and its representations
is reflected in the following assertion by Chief Justice Burger in Miller v.
California: "Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films
or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more
than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such
33. "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me. Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image,
nor any manner of likeness, of any thing that is in heaven above .. " Exodus 20: 3-4, in PENTA-
TEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1.
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public places." Similarly, in his discussion of hard core pornography,
Fred Schauer maintains that "it is... designed to produce a purely phys-
ical effect [and is] essentially a physical rather than a mental stimulus
.... [H]ardcore pornography is sex ... ,,35 Both of these statements
suggest that representations of sexual conduct can plausibly be treated as
surrogates of the sexual conduct depicted.
IV. THE SACRED OBSCENE, PRIVACY AND PORNOGRAPHY
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
When speech is in the world of the First Amendment-meaning
that it has First Amendment protection-it is part of the marketplace of
ideas and competes with other speech for attention and action. The mar-
ketplace puts a value on that speech, but the valuation process is dy-
namic: the value of particular speech changes from time to time. To
describe certain speech as sacred under my deconstructive interpretation
means that it does not have First Amendment protection. When speech
dealing with certain sexual conduct is thus sacralized, it means that gov-
ernment may determine that it does not belong in the marketplace of
ideas because it cannot and should not be valued in marketplace terms.
A second characteristic of the marketplace of ideas is that the ideas
bought and sold there are treated like commodities bought and sold in
the marketplace of products and services. The latter marketplace is part
of the everyday world and is therefore nothing out of the ordinary. To
permit obscene speech, whose subject is sexual conduct, in the market-
place similarly treats that speech like any other commodity. In effect,
sexual conduct, which is sacred, is commoditized.
A third characteristic is that ideas are bought and sold publicly. To
the extent that obscene speech is permitted in that marketplace, represen-
tations of sexual conduct are necessarily bought and sold publicly as well.
Yet one of the sacred aspects of sexual conduct is that it is private.
Thus, excluding obscenity from the First Amendment functions to
preserve the sacred nature of sexual conduct by preventing its commer-
cialization and exposure in the marketplace. This anti-commercializa-
tion aspect of obscenity doctrine is demonstrated especially clearly in
Ginzburg v. United States,36 where the Supreme Court determined that
"the question of obscenity may include consideration of the setting in
34. 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973).
35. Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity'" An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 922, 923, 926 (1979).
36. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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which the publications were presented. '37 In Ginzburg, the defendant
attempted to mail his publications from Intercourse and Blue Ball, Penn-
sylvania, and his advertising "boasted" that his publications would "take
full advantage ... of an unrestricted license allowed by law in the expres-
sion of sex and sexual matters. ' 38 The Court ruled that "commercial
exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal [may]
support the determination that the material is obscene even though in
other contexts the material would escape such condemnation. ' 39
This function of First Amendment obscenity doctrine-permitting
government to preserve the sacred nature of sexual conduct4°-is to a
considerable extent consistent with, and complements, Supreme Court
decisions that prevent the state from interfering with sexual conduct in
the marital relationship.4 1
B. Privacy
The Supreme Court's right of privacy decisions, particularly those
relating to sexual conduct in marriage, are the other side of the high
value, sacred obscenity interpretation that I propose. These decisions
prevent the state from interfering with the sexual conduct of married
heterosexuals because that conduct is sacred. A good example is the
Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut42 where the state
attempted to regulate the sexual conduct of husband and wife in the pri-
vacy of the home. The Court ruled that the constitutional right of pri-
vacy prevents a state from so doing.
It is because such sexual conduct is sacred that First Amendment
obscenity doctrine and the right of privacy function to protect it against
desacralization. In the case of obscenity, the sources of the danger are
private persons who wish to buy and sell obscene material. In the case of
the right of privacy, the source of the danger is the state which attempts
to regulate marital sexual conduct. Regardless of the source, in both
cases the function of the applicable constitutional doctrines is to preserve
the sacred nature of this sexual conduct.
37. Id. at 465.
38. Id. at 468.
39. Id. at 466, 476.
40. Chief Justice Burger intimated a view of obscenity resembling mine when he described sex
as "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare and
the development of human personality... [that] can be debased and distorted by crass commercial
exploitation .... Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).
41. Homosexual conduct, pornography and feminist theory, and whether they fit my interpre-
tation, are addressed at Part IV.
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The complementary relationship between First Amendment obscen-
ity doctrine and the right of privacy is further buttressed by the fact that
the only meaningful protection carved out by the Supreme Court for ob-
scenity is found in a privacy case involving a home, no less. In Stanley v.
Georgia4 3 the Court ruled that the state may not suppress obscenity in
the privacy on one's home: to do so would amount to an attempt to
control a person's private thoughts. Stanley is unique among the
Supreme Court's obscenity decisions because it is clear that the state may
prevent persons from buying and selling obscene material outside of the
home.44 It is only where a person succeeds in getting it into the home
that First Amendment protection becomes applicable.
Stanley is consistent with my interpretation of the obscene as sacred
because it stands for the proposition that obscene representations of sex-
ual conduct are protected only in the privacy of the home. Once obscen-
ity arrives in the home, it is no longer in the marketplace of ideas to be
there valued, bought, sold and made public.
Read together, then, Griswold and substantive due process do for
marital sexual conduct in the privacy of the home what Stanley and the
First Amendment do for obscenity in the privacy of the home. Both
cases reflect a deep concern for the sacred.
C. Homosexual Conduct
The present constitutional status of homosexual conduct poses two
related difficulties for my interpretation of obscenity doctrine and its con-
nection to privacy doctrine. Clearly, representations of homosexual con-
duct can qualify as obscene under the Miller test, a test which I took as a
given for the purposes of this Article. Under my interpretation, this
ought to mean that obscenity doctrine functions to prevent the desacral-
ization of homosexual conduct because it is sacred. But this is problem-
atic if one looks historically at the Judaeo/Christian grounding of my
interpretation. Under that tradition, as constituted over two millennia
ago, homosexual conduct was clearly not considered sacred. To the con-
trary, it was taboo.45
There is a problem with my interpretation on the privacy side as
well. Suppose that homosexual conduct were considered sacred under
43. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
44. The Court made clear in Paris Adult Theatre that Stanley's privacy rationale does not apply
outside of the home. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
45. "If a man lie with a man as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination;
they shall be put to death, their blood in on them." Leviticus 18:22 in PENTATEUCH AND
HAFroitAHS, supra note 1.
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obscenity doctrine so that government could prevent its desacralization
by prohibiting the marketing of its representations. Nevertheless, cur-
rent privacy doctrine, as exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,46 holds unequivocally that homosexual conduct is
not protected by substantive due process. Consequently, while my
deconstructive interpretation, satisfactorily explains the relationship
among obscenity doctrine, privacy doctrine and heterosexual conduct, it
apparently does not do the same for homosexual conduct.
There are various ways of dealing with this problem. That my
deconstructive interpretation does not satisfactorily account for every as-
pect of obscenity and privacy doctrine as they are presently constituted
does not destroy the fundamental insight that obscenity doctrine can in
large measure be grounded on the sacred nature of heterosexual conduct.
After all, the current low value assumption of obscenity doctrine which I
deconstruct generates its own serious problems of which every First
Amendment scholar is aware.47
But there is a better response. In setting out my deconstructive in-
terpretation, I took current obscenity and privacy doctrines as givens.
However, I am certainly not wedded to these doctrines as a critical mat-
ter. My deconstructive interpretation is not inconsistent with the sugges-
tion that homosexual conduct may be considered sacred because the
category of sacred sexual conduct should not be frozen into a position
several millennia old. Indeed, various mainstream religious denomina-
tions have recently determined that homosexual conduct and relation-
ships may partake of the sacred.48 Similarly, I can adhere to my
deconstructive interpretation of obscenity doctrine while at the same
time maintaining that Bowers v. Hardwick was incorrectly decided. Con-
sequently, if substantive due process were to protect homosexual con-
duct, then the fit between that privacy doctrine and an obscenity doctrine
that considered representations of homosexual conduct to be sacred
would be a good one.
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
47. These include: the questionable assumption that obscenity possesses low or no value even
though obscenity deals with sexuality, one of the most important aspects of human life; the incom-
patibility of obscenity doctrine with the marketplace of ideas and individual autonomy/self fulfill-
ment rationales of the First Amendment; and the absence of any real proof that the dissemination of
obscenity causes harm.
48. For example, the leaders of Reconstructionist Judaism recently adopted a statement on
homosexuality and Judaism which
affirms that "kedushah," or holiness, resides in committed homosexual relationships, and
welcomes lesbian and gay individuals and families as full and equal members of congrega-
tions and havurot, "with the same rights and responsibilities as heterosexual individuals
and families."
CHI. JEWISH SENTINEL, Feb. 20, 1992, at 25.
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D. Pornography and Feminist Theory
In contrast, my high value interpretation of obscenity appears in-
compatible with .the argument made by some feminists that government
should be allowed to ban non-obscene pornography because it depicts the
subordination and dehumanization of women and presents them either as
submissive sexual objects who enjoy pain, humiliation and rape or as
whores.49 This argument, because it is obviously harm-based, can readily
be made consistent with the dominant low value assumption of current
obscenity doctrine which is similarly harm-based. 50 In effect, the argu-
ment seeks to expand the categories of unprotected speech under the
First Amendment.
However, inasmuch as this position defines pornography primarily
in terms of the insubordination and dehumanization of women, it cannot
be squared with a view that pornography is sacred. Only if the feminist
argument were fundamentally recast to the effect that pornography de-
bases the sexuality of both men and women could it be made consistent
with my deconstructive interpretation. If it were so recast, then pornog-
raphy would not have to be considered sacred under my interpretation in
order for feminists to argue that it should be banned. Rather, banning
pornography would prophylactically protect the sacred nature of
sexuality. 5
CONCLUSION
Mircea Eliade was correct when he observed that modern men and
women are still surrounded by the sacred and by ritual. 52 This is surely
true for constitutional law, even apart from the obvious religious consid-
erations implicated in cases involving the First Amendment's establish-
ment and free exercise clauses. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, 53 Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Texas v. Johnson,54 the flag-
desecration case, can best be understood as an argument about the sa-
cred. Similarly, Sanford Levinson's analysis of what he terms "constitu-
tional faith" resonates with religious concepts.5 5 And Robert Bellah's
49. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (1985). But see American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding anti-pornography ordinance unconstitutional).
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
51. Compare supra note 6, where I make a similar point regarding depictions of bestiality and
excretory functions.
52. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
53. See Nahmod, supra note 14.
54. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
55. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
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concept of American civil religion does the same.56
Along parallel lines, I have suggested that a deconstructed obscenity
doctrine, with its low value assumption replaced by a high value assump-
tion, can be grounded on a Judaeo/Christian position of sexuality very
different from the Augustinian position. This interpretation of obscenity
doctrine, as complemented by privacy doctrine, permits government to
draw a line at the sacred obscene and to declare that private persons may
not desacralize it in the marketplace. 57 On this view, government may
educate the political community with respect to the sacred nature of sex-
uality. True, this governmental role is controversial from a classical lib-
eral perspective. But surely it is no more so than the current educational
role of government, grounded on the low value assumption of obscenity,
as to the sinful and harmful nature of sexuality.
56. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in American, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967). See generally
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (Donald G. Jones & Russell E. Richey eds., 1974). I consider Ameri-
can civil religion briefly in Nahmod, supra note 14, at 536-37.
57. My purpose in this Article has been to explore the possibility of grounding First Amend-
ment obscenity doctrine on a high value assumption and to consider some of the implications of such
a move. I am aware, of course, that any discourse about the sacred and sexuality may reflect the
exercise of power. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to
Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989). Thus, it may be argued that such discourse, supported as it appears
to be by traditional religious values, would serve only to perpetuate the status quo with respect to
women and homosexuals. One answer is that traditional religious values can and do change, albeit
very slowly. Another is that the current low value assumption of obscenity doctrine, coupled with
present privacy doctrine, is surely no better for women and homosexuals.
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